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For social species, recognizing and adequately yet quickly responding to the emotions of others is crucial for
their survival. The current study investigates attentional biases toward emotions in two closely related species,
humans and chimpanzees. Prior research has demonstrated that humans typically show an attentional bias
toward emotions. We here build on that literature by studying the underlying unconscious mechanisms within
and across humans and chimpanzees and aim to gain insight into the evolutionary continuity of expressions.
Experiment 1 tested whether chimpanzees show an attentional bias toward the expressions of conspecifics and
whether this putative bias is modulated by the stimulus presentation duration, being 33 ms or 300 ms. The
stimuli were followed by a visual mask in the form of a neutral body image. This backward-masking
procedure eliminated the visibility of the stimuli that were presented for 33 ms, rendering their presentation
subliminal. In contrast to our prediction, no attentional bias toward emotions was observed in chimpanzees.
The goal of Experiment 2 was to verify this finding and to investigate chimpanzees’ reaction to human stimuli.
Replicating Experiment 1, no evidence of an attentional bias toward emotions was observed in chimpanzees.
In Experiment 3 we used the same chimpanzee and human expressions in 711 museum visitors and confirmed
that humans do have an attentional bias toward emotions. Interestingly, this bias was independent of the
stimulus presentation duration and most strikingly, independent of the species that was observed. Implications
for theorizing about species differences in attentional mechanisms in processing emotions are discussed, as
well as directions for future research, to investigate our preliminary findings and this potential species
difference further.
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For social species, recognizing emotions from conspecifics has
great survival value. Research in humans and chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes) shows that both species (a) recognize conspecifics’
emotional expressions (for research in humans, Ekman, & Friesen,
1982; Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 2013; for studies with chim-
panzees, see Buttelmann, Call, & Tomasello, 2009; Parr, 2001),
(b) have better memory for pictures showing emotional as com-
pared to neutral expressions (humans, Reisberg, & Heuer, 1992;
chimpanzees, Kano, Tanaka, & Tomonaga, 2008), and (c) show
prolonged attention to emotional versus nonemotional images (for
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a review in humans, see Palermo & Rhodes, 2007; for a study in
chimpanzees, see Kano, & Tomonaga, 2010). The majority of
emotion research in humans has focused on the perception of facial
expressions (Adolphs, 2002; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000).
In everyday life, however, affective states are expressed by the
whole body, revealing it, in turn, to the observer (Atkinson, Dittrich,
Gemmell, & Young, 2004; Atkinson, Heberlein, & Adolphs, 2007;
de Gelder, Snyder, Greve, Gerard, & Hadjikhani, 2004; Kret, & de
Gelder, 2010, 2013; Kret, Pichon, Grèzes, & de Gelder, 2011a,
2011b; Mondloch, Nelson, & Horner, 2013; Sinke, Kret, & de
Gelder, 2011; for a review, see de Gelder, van Honk, & Tamietto,
2011). Thus far, it is not known whether humans and chimpanzees
can recognize each other’s bodily expressions of emotion. In the
current study, we take a comparative approach and investigate the
similarities and differences between humans and chimpanzees in
their reactions to conspecifics’ or other species’ whole body ex-
pressions of emotion.
Seeing a conspecific being emotional and expressing that via
facial expressions or through body language immediately attracts
attention and automatically triggers action tendencies in observers
(Frijda, 2016, 1987; Prochazkova & Kret, 2017). Emotions’ po-
tential for action supports an evolutionary account, which assumes
that emotions evolved to benefit the organism by responding more
adequately to threats in the environment (de Waal, 2011; Nesse,
1990). Indeed, we use another’s emotion signals to guide our
actions, for example, to initiate an approach reaction toward a
person who is happily smiling at you or to avoid someone with an
angry expression. Even more basic responses, such as fight or
flight reactions, can be triggered by observing emotional expres-
sions in others (LeDoux, 1996; Öhman & Soares, 1993). The field
of emotion research is dominated by investigations of facial ex-
pressions and studies including bodily expressions are still scarce.
However, two of the most illustrious theoreticians of emotion,
Darwin and James, discussed whole-body expressions at great
length. Darwin famously included postural descriptions in The
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, revealing simi-
larities across species and their ancient functions (Darwin, 1872),
and James (1890) investigated the recognition of emotion with
photographs of whole-body postures. Faces and bodies are equally
salient and familiar in daily life and often convey some of the same
information (de Gelder, Van den Stock, Meeren, Kret, & Tamietto,
2009). Interestingly, when they do not, it is oftentimes the body
that reveals the expresser’s genuine feelings (Aviezer, Trope, &
Todorov, 2012).
In recent decades, researchers have taken up the issue of bodily
expression recognition, and results from a number of behavioral
experiments using independent stimulus sets now allow us to
conclude that recognition performance for bodily expressions is
very similar to face stimuli. For instance, in line with numerous
studies that have demonstrated attentional biases to facial expres-
sions of emotion, a study by Kret and de Gelder (2013) showed
that when two body postures were presented simultaneously on a
computer screen, angry postures attracted the most attention and
more so than happy ones. Another more recent study measured
action tendencies toward fearful, angry, and neutral facial and
bodily expressions. Specifically, participants stood in front of a
computer touch-screen and were instructed to tap as fast as they
could on emotional expressions that appeared on either side of the
screen. Results showed an attentional bias towards expressions of
anger and fear, with faster responses following these, as compared
with neutral expressions, independent of whether the emotions
were expressed by the face or the body (de Valk, Wijnen, & Kret,
2015).
Since as early as Darwin (1872), researchers have noted simi-
larities between the expressions of emotion in human and nonhu-
man primates. These species have a broad repertoire of stereotyped
facial behaviors and body postures that are seen as expressions of
emotions (Andrew, 1963; Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1973; Hinde &
Rowell, 1962; Maestripieri, 1997; Redican, 1975; Steiner, Glaser,
Hawilo, & Berridge, 2001; van Hooff, 1967). Behavioral obser-
vations have demonstrated that nonhuman primate emotional ex-
pressions and human emotional expressions can play similar func-
tional roles (Kret & Straffon, 2018). For example, human infants
tend to use a pout face to solicit their mother’s attention, and a
similar facial expression can be found in infant chimpanzees for
the same bonding functions (Blurton Jones, 1971; van Lawick-
Goodall, 1968). Furthermore, chimpanzees exhibit silent bared-
teeth displays and play faces that assist in social bonding and
the maintenance of social groups. In humans, the same bonding
function is served by smiling, which looks similar to those
chimpanzee displays (Burrows, Waller, Parr, & Bonar, 2006;
Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1973, 1982; Kret & Straffon, 2018;
Preuschoft & van Hooff, 1995; van Hooff, 1967, 1972; see
Gaspar, 2006, for a review).
Nonhuman primates are able to not only merely express emo-
tions but also successfully distinguish emotional expressions in
others. Chimpanzees are capable of discriminating an emotional
facial expression made by two different individuals from that of a
neutral expression of a third individual. Successful discrimination
of different emotional expressions was dependent on the amount of
shared features between the two expressions, as is also known to
be the case in humans (Parr, Hopkins, & de Waal, 1998). In
another study comparing chimpanzees and rhesus macaques, it was
shown that both species are able to use facial expressions to
discriminate unfamiliar conspecifics, although the macaques re-
quired more trials to learn the task (Parr, Winslow, Hopkins, & de
Waal, 2000). Rhesus monkeys are also capable of discriminating
emotional expressions from neutral expressions, yet they showed
more difficulties with discriminating two distinct emotional ex-
pressions (Parr & Heintz, 2009). Moreover, other research has
demonstrated that macaque cardiac physiology is sensitive to the
valence of passively viewed sensory stimuli (Bliss-Moreau, Machado,
Bauman, & Amaral, 2013). One key mechanism that is at play when
processing conspecifics’ expressions of emotion, is increased atten-
tion toward these expressions.
Attention toward the expressions of conspecifics is a topic that
has been addressed in a number of previous experimental studies.
In a recent eye-tracking study for instance, it was shown that
macaque monkeys attend more quickly and also attend longer to
monkeys showing aggressive or submissive compared with neutral
behaviors. This effect was driven by heightened attention to the
body (Bliss-Moreau, Moadab, & Machado, 2017), a finding rep-
licating earlier findings in humans (Kret, Stekelenburg, Roelofs, &
de Gelder, 2013). In that latter study, it was also found that
humans’ level of arousal was higher when they observed images of
people of whom both the face and the body showed anger or fear
compared with happiness (see also Kret, Roelofs, Stekelenburg, &






































































































396 KRET, MURAMATSU, AND MATSUZAWA
expressed by the face and the body and that expressions, especially
threat displays, are readily picked up by observers and facilitate
fast actions.
The underlying neural mechanism that makes us attend to emo-
tions is still not understood completely. The literature shows that
subcortical, evolutionary old brain structures play key roles in
emotion processing across and beyond different primate species
(Bliss-Moreau, Bauman, & Amaral, 2011, for a review, see Pessoa
& Adolphs, 2010) One possible way to tap into this mechanism is
by visually masking experimental stimuli. Visual masking results
in the reduction or elimination of the visibility of one brief stim-
ulus by the presentation of a second brief stimulus, called the
“mask.” If a stimulus is followed by a blank screen, the perceptual
presentation duration of the stimulus is somewhat prolonged due to
the after image. When instead of a blank screen a carefully selected
visual mask is presented, there is no such after image, and the
stimulus presentation duration is better secured. Masking stimuli
would yield similar or even larger effects on emotional attention
than unmasked stimuli (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Hedger, Gray, Garner, &
Adams, 2016). We here aim to examine this possibility by inves-
tigating attentional biases toward subliminally (below thresholds)
and supraliminally (can be processed consciously) presented emo-
tional expressions in human and chimpanzee observers, by using
the dot-probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). In the
dot-probe task, two pictures are briefly being presented next to
each other on a computer screen. Next, one of the two is replaced
by a dot, the location of which participants need to indicate as fast
as possible by using the arrows “left” and “right” on a keyboard,
or by touching the dot directly on a touch screen. Typically, as
attention is attracted to biologically relevant stimuli, touching the
dot is faster when it replaces an emotion compared with neutral
image. This task is often used in psychology and has a lot of
potential for testing emotional attention across primate species
primarily because this test is implicit and because evidence, al-
though still scarce, is accumulating that it does not require verbal
instruction. Moreover, subjects need no or minimal training to
perform the test successfully (King, Kurdziel, Meyer, & Lacreuse,
2012; Kret, Jaasma, Bionda, & Wijnen, 2016; Parr, Modi, Siebert,
& Young, 2013; Tomonaga & Imura, 2009; see van Rooijen,
Ploeger, & Kret, 2017 for a review). The majority of dot-probe
studies have used a stimulus presentation duration of 500 ms. A
limitation of this presentation duration is that attention may al-
ready have shifted between the two stimuli. Thus, responses given
after a stimulus presentation of 500 ms do not necessarily provide
information about participants’ initial orientation (Bradley, Mogg,
& Millar, 2000). To avoid this, other dot-probe studies used a
shorter or even subliminal stimulus presentation. A meta-analysis
showed that the effect size of subliminal presentation was twice as
large as that of supraliminal presentation in anxious individuals
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007). A more recent meta-analysis of 28 masked
dot-probe experiments found a small effect of a threat bias, com-
parable with the effect of the supraliminal presentation in the
review of Bar-Haim et al. (2007) (Hedger et al., 2016).
If this evolutionary ancient route that facilitates the processing
of emotions is indeed involved, then it is likely that chimpanzees
will process emotions similarly as humans. Thus, they will show
similar attentional biases, especially toward the masked stimuli.
We aim to investigate this possibility in the current study. More-
over, we will address the question of whether humans are perceiv-
ing chimpanzee expressions similarly as humans, and vice versa.
Darwin (1872) claimed that some emotional expressions have
evolutionary ancient roots and are innate: “the young and the old
of widely different races, both with man and animals, express the
same state of mind by the same movements” (p. 348; see also
Scherer, Clark-Polner, & Mortillaro, 2011). Following this ratio-
nale, one could argue that if so, species might be able to recognize
the emotional expressions of other species. Research on the per-
ception of emotion in other species is still scarce, but some studies
suggest that this might indeed be the case. In a recent article, Fillipi
et al. (2017) showed that fundamental aspects of vocal emotional
expressions are shared across all extant species that trace their
ancestry to early terrestrial tetrapods. More specifically, in their
study, they identified acoustic universals that conveyed the same
emotional information across a broad range of vocalizing species
and showed that humans can use these universals to correctly infer
the emotional state of other species. Cross-species emotion per-
ception has also been investigated in a study with dogs. The study
combined visual and auditory cues in a cross-modal preferential
looking paradigm. Dogs were presented human or dog faces with
different emotional valences (happy/playful vs. angry/aggressive),
paired with a single vocalization from the same individual with
either a positive or negative valence or Brownian noise. The results
showed that dogs looked significantly longer at the face whose
expression was congruent rather than incongruent to the valence of
the vocalization, for both conspecifics and heterospecifics. This
result demonstrates that dogs can extract and integrate bimodal
sensory emotional information and discriminate between positive
and negative emotions from both humans and dogs (Albuquerque
et al., 2016). In the case of domestic dogs, it can be argued that it
might be particularly advantageous to recognize the emotions of
humans as these are their daily companions. Also, human–dog
coevolution might have facilitated this process. However, primate
observation studies came to similar conclusions. For instance,
Diana monkeys understand the meaning and underlying cause of
other primate species’ alarm calls, guinea fowl alarm calls, and
different kinds of chimpanzee screams (Zuberbühler, 2000). An-
other study in humans listening to human, macaque, or cat vocal-
izations also suggests there are shared emotional systems across
species (Belin et al., 2008). However, none of these studies di-
rectly compared the processing of emotion signals from their own
to other species in a cross-species experimental setting. Therefore,
comparing human and chimpanzees’ attentional biases toward
emotional expressions from their own compared with the other
species will show similarities and differences and indirectly inform
us about the evolution of processing emotional expressions. Re-
search on emotion perception across these two closely related
species may provide crucial insights in the adaptive value of
emotional expressions and their perception.
In three experiments, we took a comparative approach to get
more insight into emotional attention within and across two closely
related species. Using the emotional dot-probe paradigm, Experi-
ment 1 tested whether chimpanzees, like humans, show an atten-
tional bias toward the expressions of conspecifics and whether this
putative bias is modulated by the stimulus presentation duration,
being 33 ms or 300 ms, both visually masked (i.e., the stimulus is
immediately followed by a visual mask in the form of a neutral






































































































397EMOTION PROCESSING IN HUMANS AND CHIMPANZEES
ment 2 was to replicate and extend findings from Experiment 1 by
using the same paradigm, but with additional stimuli showing
human expressions. In a previous study conducted in humans,
these same stimuli have reliably yielded an attentional bias toward
the ones showing emotional compared to neutral content (de Valk
et al., 2015). Other research has investigated the role of expertise
and conceptual knowledge on how other species emotions are
categorized (Fugate, Gouzoules, & Barrett, 2010; Pongrácz, Mol-
nár, & Miklósi, 2006). However, whether expertise has any influ-
ence on implicit attentional biases is hitherto not known. By using
the exact same paradigm as Experiment 2, Experiment 3 tested
attentional biases toward emotions in 711 visitors of a science
museum in The Netherlands.
Hypotheses
We predicted that chimpanzees (Experiment 1 and 2) and hu-
mans (Experiment 3) would show an attentional bias toward the
emotional expressions of conspecifics. Whereas some research
suggests that species experience the emotions of other species
similarly to those expressed by their conspecifics, other research
contradicts that (Fugate et al., 2010; Madsen, Persson, Sayehli,
Lenninger, & Sonesson, 2013; Martin-Malivel, & Okada, 2007).
From an evolutionary perspective (Darwin, 1872), we expect that
species would process expressions from conspecifics and other
species similarly. Based on our previous study with a similar
paradigm (de Valk, Wijnen, & Kret, 2015), we do not predict
differences between fear and anger in this task. Both emotions are
salient, biologically relevant stimuli that are likely to drive atten-
tion. Following the same reasoning, we do not expect to see
differences between chimpanzees’ expressions of dominance (dis-
play) or submission. Finally, based on a previous meta-analysis,
we predict that the putative attentional bias toward emotions is
stronger when stimuli are presented subliminally versus supralim-
inally (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).
Experiment 1: Emotional Dot-Probe Task in
Chimpanzee Observers With Chimpanzee Expressions
Method
Participants. Eight chimpanzees (two female juvenile and
one male juvenile, and four female and one male adult) partici-
pated in this study. They were 24 years old on average (SD  12).
At the time of testing, the chimpanzees lived within a social group
of 14 individuals in an enriched environment with a 700-m2
outdoor compound and an attached indoor residence that was
illuminated during day time at the Kyoto University Research Unit
in Inuyama, Japan. The outdoor compound was equipped with
climbing frames, ropes, small streams, and various species of trees.
Access to the outdoor compound was available to them every other
day during the day. Daily meals included a wide variety of fresh
fruits and vegetables fed throughout the day supplemented with
nutritionally balanced biscuits (fed twice daily) and water avail-
able ad libitum. The chimpanzees have been familiar with humans
since birth and interact with them on a daily basis (especially
during feeding and prior to and after the experiments). They have
taken part in various cognitive experiments since youth. For the
daily experiments, the chimpanzees left the social group volun-
tarily on the request of experimenters, moved into the experimental
booth with the guidance of experimenters, and moved back to the
social group after the completion of experiments (approximately 1
hr). The care and use of the chimpanzees adhered to the third
edition of the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Primates
issued by Primate Research Institute, Kyoto University (KUPRI)
in 2010, which is compatible with the guidelines issued by the
National Institute of Health in the United States of America. The
research design was approved by the Animal Welfare and Animal
Care Committee of Primate Research Institute, Kyoto University
and by the Animal Research Committee of Kyoto University
(#2011–078). All procedures adhered to the Japanese Act on
Welfare and Management of Animals.
Stimulus material. A total of 161 pictures of male chimpan-
zees’ whole body postures showing submission (fear grimace),
display (lip press and erased hair), and neutral expressions were
selected from a large database containing pictures of chimpanzees
from the Chimpanzee Sanctuary Uto, Kumamoto Sanctuary, and
Higashiyama zoo in Nagoya. The pictures were cropped to mini-
mize the visibility of the background and contained 640  1024
pixels. Interfering objects that were visible in the background were
removed using Adobe Photoshop (Adobe Systems, San Jose, CA).
Based on the emotion-recognition and intensity scores of three
independent raters who work with chimpanzees on a daily basis,
we selected 12 clear images per emotion category. The chimpan-
zee pictures were turned to grayscale, and the overall luminance of
each picture was adjusted to achieve the mean luminance of all the
selected pictures. The reason for turning the images to grayscale is
threefold. First, colored images do not allow accurate measure-
ments of luminance. This is important as brighter images could
have popped out from the gray background more than darker
images and could have subsequently biased attention. So the
average luminance level of each image was scaled to the mean
luminance. A second reason for doing so is to be consistent with
the literature on visual masking that generally uses grayscaled
images (also to better deal with potentially confounding effects of
low-level differences between stimuli from different conditions).
Third, prior studies in chimpanzees showed they, like humans, can
recognize emotional expressions from desaturated (e.g., grayscale)
images (Kano & Tomonaga, 2010; Parr, Dove, & Hopkins, 1998).
See Figure 1.
To level out the possible effect of low-level differences between
the stimuli on reaction times (RTs) in the emotional dot-probe task,
we scrambled all stimuli with a mosaic pattern of 12  20 squares
by using MATLAB. These scrambled images contained luminance
identical to the originals and were only used to verify whether
significant effects were not related to possible low-level differ-
ences between the stimuli. In addition to the scrambled images, the
stimulus material consisted of two types of visual masks that were
carefully pilot-tested (See methods in the online supplemental
material). We choose to include two types of masks to reduce
effects of specific properties of the mask.
Each trial showed two images simultaneously, and the dot
subsequently appeared on the position of one of these images. The
stimuli were presented supraliminally (for 300 ms) or subliminally
(for 33 ms) and then immediately masked with a neutral body
image. Although we could not verify whether chimpanzees per-
ceived these stimuli consciously or not, we first verified in humans






































































































398 KRET, MURAMATSU, AND MATSUZAWA
ms. A detailed description of this procedure and the piloting of
different types of visual masks can be found in the Methods in the
online supplemental material.
Procedure. Subjects sat in an experimental booth (2.5 m
wide  2.5 m deep  2.1 m high), with the experimenter and the
subjects separated by transparent acrylic panels. The subjects
viewed a 17-in. LCD display (1280  1024 pixels). Distance to the
computer screen was 60 cm. Stimuli were presented on a computer
screen with a 60-Hz refresh rate and with a distance of 218 pixels
between the two stimuli. A food reward was provided after the
chimpanzee tapped on the target. Each chimpanzee completed
1,120 trials on 10 days in total, spread out over a 2-week period.
There were one or two testing sessions per day, at most times, one
in the morning and one in the afternoon. The trials were random-
ized. We equally divided the number of trials over the condition,
Presentation Duration (2), Target-Distracting Expression (6)
Scramble/Nonscramble (2), and Dot Location (2), and also coun-
terbalanced the trials by mask type (2, as we had two different
versions of masks). A trial started with a dot presented at the
middle, lower part of the computer screen. After touching the dot,
two pictures (always both scrambled or both normal) were pre-
sented for 33 ms (300 ms), followed by a masking image presented
for 300 ms (33 ms), followed by a dot on the position of one of the
pictures. Subjects touched the dot, followed by a blank gray screen
that was presented for 1,000 ms. The dots were presented until
subjects touched the dot.
Experimental design and data analysis. Within a trial, there
were always two different emotions presented (fear–anger, fear–
neutral, and neutral–anger). Thus, target emotion and distracting
emotion were not independent because the same emotions were
never presented next to each other in one trial. Data were analyzed
in a two-level generalized mixed model implemented in SPSS
Version 20, IBM Statistics where trials were nested within sessions
and within participants. Reaction times larger than 2,500 ms were
excluded (1.97%). As the data were skewed, a gamma probability
distribution was selected with a log link function (which is similar
to a log transformation). The statistical model had the following
fixed factors included: Target Emotion (anger, fear, or neutral),
Presentation Duration (33/300 ms), Target Emotion  Presenta-
tion Duration, Distracting Emotion (anger, fear, or neutral), Dis-
tracting Emotion  Presentation Duration, and Age of Subject.
Because the value of the intercept may differ over participants, a
random intercept was included. Traditionally, the dot-probe task is
analyzed with bias scores. However, it has recently been recom-
mended to refrain from that method if the sample is very small. A
better procedure for the application of the dot-probe task in sam-
ples with a small N is to not average any data points and nest all
trials within each subject via a multilevel statistical procedure.
That way, RTs can be analyzed as a function of the picture that
appeared previously on the location of the probe and as a function
of the picture that earlier appeared on the other location, the
location opposite of the probe (van Rooijen et al., 2017). This
procedure was also followed in our previous study with bonobos
(Kret et al., 2016).
Results
An analysis of the RTs showed that overall, chimpanzees did not
show the classical attentional bias typically observed in the dot-
probe task, as has been described often in the human and nonhu-
man primate literature (faster RTs toward emotions [for a review
see van Rooijen et al., 2017]; p  .906). Instead, there was an
interaction between Presentation Duration and Distracting Emo-
tion, F(2, 4.565)  3.033, p  .048. Simple contrasts show that
Presentation Duration only matters when the distracting image
shows a neutral stimulus. Reaction times are longer in the trials
where stimuli were shown for 300 ms rather than for 33 ms and
where the distracting image showed an individual in a neutral state,
t(4.565)  2.634, p  .008. Age did not significantly predict RTs,
although a trend towards significance was observed F(2, 4.565) 
3.619, p  .057. See Table 1.
Conclusion
The effect that has been observed many times in humans, as well
as in bonobos (Kret et al., 2016) and macaques (Parr et al., 2013),
Figure 1. (A) Stimulus examples of chimpanzee expressions. (B) Mother
and son (Ai and Ayumu), separated by a glass panel, performing the task






































































































399EMOTION PROCESSING IN HUMANS AND CHIMPANZEES
was not replicated in chimpanzees. A previous study has shown
that chimpanzees’ attention is grabbed by neutral faces more than
by different objects (Tomonaga & Imura, 2009), and we therefore
had not expected this finding. There can be many reasons for why
this null-finding was obtained, one of them being chance. An
unanticipated effect that we did obtain, however, was an interac-
tion between Presentation Duration and Distracting Emotion. To
confirm this effect and to confirm the null finding with regard to
Target Emotion, we ran the experiment one more time for confir-
mation and in addition added human expressions, which in the past
have yielded reliable attentional biases in humans (de Valk et al.,
2015).
Experiment 2: Emotional Dot-Probe Task in
Chimpanzee Observers Observing Chimpanzee and
Human Expressions
Method
Participants. Seven chimpanzees of the previous study again
participated two years later. Due to circumstances, one adult
female could not be tested.
Stimulus material. In addition to the stimuli used in Exper-
iment 1 (12 clear images of chimpanzees per emotion category),
we selected 36 (3  12) images showing human expressions. The
heads in the human stimuli are taken from the NimStim stimulus
set (Tottenham, Borscheid, Ellertsen, Marcus, & Nelson, 2002).
Pictures of human bodily expressions of emotion were taken from
the stimulus database Bodily Expressive Action Stimulus Test
(BEAST), containing 254 digital pictures (de Gelder & van den
Stock, 2011). The pictures were shot in a professional photo studio
under constant lighting conditions. Nonprofessional actors were
individually instructed in a standardized procedure to display
different expressions with the whole body. The instructions pro-
vided a few specific and representative daily events typically
associated with each emotion (for more details, see de Gelder et al.,
2009). For the current study, we selected the best male actors, with
recognition scores above 80% correct for the emotions anger, fear,
and neutral. Pictures were presented in grayscale, against a gray
background. Using Adobe Photoshop, the luminance of each stimulus
was modified to the average luminance. A final check was made with
a light meter on the test computer screen. See Figure 2.
Procedure. The experimental setup and procedure was similar
to Experiment 1 except that we had in addition to chimpanzee
images, an equal number of human images included. The chim-
panzees completed 96 trials per session. The completed one or two
sessions per day (one in the morning and one in the afternoon)
spread out over 6 days that all fell within a few couple of weeks.
In total, each chimpanzee completed 576 trials. There were 24
trials in total per condition (Species [2], Emotion [3], Presentation
Duration [2], Scramble-Normal [2]). The order of presentation was
randomized.
Experimental design and data analysis. The statistical de-
sign was similar to Experiment 1, with Species Stimulus and
interactions with the other factors in addition. Again, trials with
RTs larger than 2,500 ms were excluded (1.05%). The data were
analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 1.
Results
Again, chimpanzees did not show the classical dot-probe effect
as humans (e.g., faster RTs toward emotions; p  .603). None of




33 ms 300 ms
Target Context M SE M SE
Display Fear 672.535 12.360 682.329 13.290
Display Neutral 650.276 10.921 680.867 14.523
Fear Display 671.628 13.139 662.960 11.237
Fear Neutral 662.545 11.561 696.749 15.821
Neutral Display 670.704 12.283 664.416 10.201
Neutral Fear 681.447 13.320 668.370 11.674







































































































400 KRET, MURAMATSU, AND MATSUZAWA
Conclusion
Confirming Experiment 1, chimpanzees did not show an atten-
tional bias toward the emotions of either conspecifics or humans.
The previous finding of an interaction between Presentation Du-
ration and Distracting Emotion was not replicated. Because this
effect was not anticipated in the first place and was only small, we
have to conclude that this was probably a false positive. In the next
experiment, we investigate how human observers perceive chim-
panzee compared with human expressions. See Table 2.
Experiment 3: Emotional Dot-Probe Task in Human
Observers Observing Chimpanzee and
Human Expressions
Method
Participants. A total of 711 (342 female) visitors of the
science museum NEMO in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, partic-
ipated. Participants were 25 years old on average, and their age
ranged from 4 to 103 years old. The sample included 241 children
(18 years old). Participants were approached by the test leaders,
attracted via posters that hang in the museum, or were informed via
a call on the museums’ “Science Live” website. All participants
filled out an informed consent before taking part in the experiment.
The study was performed in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki and approved by the local medical ethical committee.
Stimulus material. The same stimulus material was used as in
Experiment 2. Hence, people saw chimpanzee and human images.
Experimental procedure. The testing room was located in a
separate and quiet section of the science museum NEMO in
Amsterdam. Two museum visitors were tested at a time and were
supervised by two experimenters. Upon their arrival to the testing
room, participants, often families, were seated at a table and given
an information brochure to read. There were two versions, one for
adults and one for children. After reading, the test leader provided
a verbal summary. If the procedures were understood correctly, the
test leader handed them the informed consent to sign. Parents were
signing for their children.
Participants were seated behind the computer screen and com-
pleted two tasks: first an emotional dot-probe task and then an
emotional-intensity rating task. For the emotional-intensity rating
task, participants were presented with angry, fearful, and neutral
human and chimpanzee images and instructed to rate “how anx-
ious” and “how angry” the presented individuals were on a 7-point
scale, ranging from not at all to ”. Although we are aware that
“display” is not a synonym for “anger,” and “submission” is not
exactly the same as “fear,” we choose to stick to these labels
because most people, children included, would know these terms.
It was stressed that there were no correct or incorrect answers and
that they had to follow their intuition. After the dot-probe task,
each participant rated a randomly drawn subset of 24 images (12
chimpanzees and 12 humans) from our total stimulus set. These
were presented in a random order.
The instruction for the emotional dot-probe task to the museum
visitors was held short and simple:
In this experiment, you will see different pictures of humans and
chimpanzees. You will also see a dot on the screen. Your task is to tap
on that dot as fast as you can. Chimpanzees have conducted the exact
same task. Do you think you can be faster than the chimpanzees?
At the end of the experiment, participants saw a bar graph with
their mean RT next to a bar representing the chimpanzee data (see
Experiment 2). All participants were given a debriefing brochure at
the end of the experiment in which they could read more back-
ground information of the study and its hypotheses.
Participants were presented with pictures of angry, fearful, and
neutral chimpanzees and humans. Each participant completed 48
trials (half with scrambled images). A trial started with a dot
presented at the middle, lower part of the computer screen. After
touching the dot, two pictures (always both scrambled or both
normal) were presented for 33 ms (300 ms), followed by a masking
image presented for 300 ms (33 ms), followed by a dot in the
position of one of the pictures. Participants touched the dot,
followed by a blank gray screen that was presented for 1,000 ms.
In the literature, mixed findings have been observed in the emo-
tional dot-probe task that might be related to differences in the task
setup. Most prior studies have used button boxes to record re-
sponses, but studies with animals have used touch screens (King et
al., 2012; Lacreuse, Schatz, Strazzullo, King, & Ready, 2013). To
solve that issue, half of the participants in the museum conducted
the task with a button box and half of them with the touch screen.
Because there was no difference observed between these two
samples and their RTs following the different images, we further
ignored that factor in the statistical analyses.
After the experiment, participants were thanked and given a
written debriefing with more background information of the ex-
Table 2
Study 2 Results
Chimpanzee stimulus Human stimulus
Presentation duration Presentation duration
33 ms 300 ms 33 ms 300 ms
Target-Context M SE M SE M SE M SE
Display Fear 437.145 20.900 488.310 29.238 454.687 24.975 445.179 20.066
Display Neutral 486.627 33.034 438.940 20.178 462.904 22.006 451.560 20.649
Fear Display 516.585 37.960 421.716 14.074 461.310 29.185 476.313 32.489
Fear Neutral 432.964 23.633 477.060 25.363 500.190 41.268 439.451 19.725
Neutral Display 476.667 26.307 488.337 31.041 444.060 27.024 439.169 21.391






































































































401EMOTION PROCESSING IN HUMANS AND CHIMPANZEES
periment, and they could leave their e-mail address if they wished
to remain informed on the outcomes of the study.
Experimental design and data analysis. Anger and fear in-
tensity scores were analyzed in a two-level generalized mixed
model, implemented in SPSS Version 20. The 24 different trials
were nested within participants. RTs larger than 2,500 ms were
excluded (0.25%). Because the data were skewed, a gamma prob-
ability distribution was selected with a log link function (Kret et
al., 2016). Fixed factors included the following: Species Stimulus
(human or chimpanzee), Emotion Stimulus (anger, fear, or neu-
tral), Rating Type (fear or anger intensity), and their interactions.
Because the value of the intercept may differ over participants, a
random intercept was included.
The dot-probe task had the same design as Experiment 2. Within
a trial, there were always two different emotions presented (fear–
anger, fear–neutral, and neutral–anger). Data were analyzed in a
two-level generalized mixed model, where the trials were nested
within participants. Due to the large age variability in the sample
and the known effects of age on RTs, age was added as an
additional variable.
Results
Intensity rating. There were main effects of emotion, F(2,
33.366)  3.358,792, p  .001, species stimulus, F(1, 33.366) 
420,559, p  .001, and rating type, F(1, 33.366)  864,006, p 
.001, indicating that people gave higher ratings to angry and
fearful versus neutral expressions (ps  0.001), higher ratings for
humans than for chimpanzees (p  .001), and higher anger ratings
than fear ratings (p  .001). An interaction between Emotion and
Species, F(2, 33.366)  1.073,772, p  .001, showed that the
intensity ratings for angry stimuli were higher for human as
compared with those for chimpanzee stimuli (p  .001). A much
smaller, but also significant, opposite effect was found for fearful
stimuli, which were rated as more intense in case stimuli showed
a chimpanzee versus human (p  .001). There was also an inter-
action between emotion and rating type, F(2, 33.366)  3.053,534,
p  .001, simply showing that angry pictures gained higher anger
scores than fear scores, and it was the other way around for fearful
stimuli (ps  0.001). A Species–Rating Type interaction, F(1,
33.366)  226,329, p  .001, showed that chimpanzee stimuli on
average received lower fear ratings then anger ratings (p  .001).
The same effect, although much smaller, was also found for human
stimuli (p  .001). Finally, there was a three-way interaction
between emotion, species stimulus and rating type, F(2, 33.366) 
5.104,191, p  .001. Most strikingly, this showed that fearful
chimpanzees were recognized as being angry rather than fearful
(p  .001). See Figure 3.
Dot-probe task. As we predicted, we observed a main effect
for target emotion with faster responses following angry and
fearful as compared with neutral expressions, F(2, 16.966) 
5.115, p  .006. Interestingly, this effect was not further qualified
by interactions with species stimulus, distracting emotion or stim-
ulus presentation, which adds to the robustness for this effect in
humans. Another anticipated effect was an effect of age where the
older participants had slower RTs than the younger ones, F(2, 16.
966)  10.967, p  .001. Age did not interact with any of the other
predictors.
Unanticipated other main effects were observed for other pre-
dictors, which for brevity are shown in Table 3. These main effects
were further qualified by higher order interactions. There was a
three-way interaction between species stimulus, distracting emo-
tion and stimulus presentation duration, F(2, 16. 966)  9.082,
p  .001, supported by a two-way interaction between species
stimulus and stimulus presentation duration, F(1, 16. 966) 
13.823, p  .001. Follow-up simple contrasts showed several
significant effects, which are listed in Table 4. Visual inspection of
the means showed that in the case of fearful and angry expressions,
the effect of presentation duration flipped for chimpanzee as
compared with human expressions (Figure 4). This demonstrates
that fear and anger were not processed in the same way when
expressed by a human versus when expressed by a chimpanzee.
But please note that this result is specific for the distracting
emotion and does not apply to the target emotion. Another inter-
esting observation is that presentation duration had little effect on
Figure 3. Emotional intensity scores from human observers. People gave relatively high fear-intensity scores
to fearful humans and also high anger-intensity scores to angry humans. In contrast, they rated fearful






































































































402 KRET, MURAMATSU, AND MATSUZAWA
the processing of fearful distractors, whether human or chimpan-
zee. However, presentation duration did modulate the effect of
angry and neutral distractors on RTs. This last finding, for exam-
ple, the slower RTs during trials where the distracting image
showed a neutral individual and that was presented for 33 ms
rather than 300 ms, is opposite to what was found in Study 1 with
the chimpanzee subjects.
Conclusion
Humans gave high fear ratings to stimuli depicting fearful
humans and high anger ratings to pictures showing angry humans.
Their emotion-intensity ratings were much less distinctive for
fearful and angry chimpanzee stimuli. They recognized that chim-
panzee expressions of fear (submission) and anger (display)
were not neutral but often intermingled the specific emotion labels.
In line with the literature on the emotional dot-probe task, we
observed faster responses toward emotional expressions as com-
pared with neutral expressions, independent of stimulus presenta-
tion duration and the depicted species. In addition, there was a
three-way interaction between species stimulus, distracting emo-
tion, and stimulus presentation duration. The interpretation of this
result remains admittedly speculative, but it is possible that fearful
chimpanzees, who were actually recognized as angry, highly neg-
ative, and aroused, were processed as a direct threat, for example,
as showing anger, and triggered corresponding action tendencies
similar to those evoked by stimuli showing angry humans. It is
interesting that the pattern for the two emotional expressions
reverses when expressed by chimpanzees.
Discussion
To successfully navigate the social environment, it is of crucial
importance for primates to understand the actions and emotions of
others (de Waal, 2011). In primates, humans included, nonverbal
expressions such as facial expressions and body language are used
to guide social decisions, such as to stay away from an aggressive
individual or to greet someone who smiles at you. Emotions can be
expressed unconsciously but can also be meant as communicative
signals, like the smile in humans. Either way, expressions of
Table 3
Experiment 3: Emotional Dot-Probe Task in Human Observers
Fixed factor F df1 df2 Significance
Corrected Model 4.972 18 16,966 .000
Stimulus Presentation Duration 7.741 1 16,966 .005
Distracting Emotion 3.994 2 16,966 .018
Target Emotion 5.115 2 16,966 .006
Species Stimulus 4.702 1 16,966 .030
Age of Subject 10.967 16,966 .001
Distracting Emotion  Stimulus Presentation Duration 8.304 2 16,966 .000
Target Emotion  Stimulus Presentation Duration 2.716 2 16,966 .066
Species Stimulus  Stimulus Presentation Duration 13.823 1 16,966 .000
Species Stimulus  Distracting Emotion 0.532 2 16,966 .588
Species Stimulus  Target Emotion 2.116 2 16,966 .120
Species Stimulus  Distracting Emotion  Stimulus 9.082 2 16,966 .000
95% CI
Random factor Estimate SE Z Sig. Lower Upper
Variance .094 .001 90.152 .000 .092 .096
Variance (Intercept) .076 .004 17.856 .000 .068 .085
Table 4
Results of Simple Contrast Tests
Species Stimulus
Stimulus Presentation
Duration (ms) Distracting Emotion Contrast estimate Sig.
Chimpanzee 33 Fear vs. Anger 20.772 .002a
Chimpanzee 33 Neutral vs. Fear 26.065 .001a
Chimpanzee 33 vs.300 Neutral 31.44 .000a
Chimpanzee 33 vs.300 Anger 22.155 .000a
Human 33 Neutral vs. Anger 23.629 .000a
Human 33 Neutral vs. Fear 18.567 .005
Human 300 Fear vs. Anger 16.051 .014
Human 33 vs.300 Neutral 13.357 .031
Human 33 vs.300 Anger 20.443 .001a
Anger 33 Chimpanzee vs. Human 28.715 .000a
Anger 300 Chimpanzee vs. Human 13.883 .024






































































































403EMOTION PROCESSING IN HUMANS AND CHIMPANZEES
emotion provide relevant information for observers and influence
their subsequent actions, often to the benefit of expresser and
observer (Öhman, & Soares, 1993; LeDoux, 1996). By taking a
comparative approach, the current study aimed to provide insight
into emotion processing within humans and their closest living
relatives, the chimpanzee.
Efficiently responding to others’ emotions has great survival
value, especially for social species such as primates who establish
close, long-term bonds with group members (Darwin, 1872; Spoor
& Kelly, 2004). Prior research in humans has shown that one
component of this strong sensitivity to others’ emotions is height-
ened attention to their affective states (Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco,
2006; Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003; Vuilleumier,
2005; van Rooijen et al., 2017). Together with the chimpanzee, the
bonobo is the closest living relative of humans. Studying compo-
nents of their emotional behavior, such as emotional attention, not
only helps us to understand these species better but also provides
insight into (human) emotions and their evolutionary past (Ander-
son & Adolphs, 2014; de Waal, 2014; Panksepp, 1998). We
recently demonstrated that bonobos, like humans, show increased
immediate attention to scenes depicting conspecifics showing
emotions compared with scenes with conspecifics in a neutral state
(Kret et al., 2016). In contrast to our prediction, investigating a
putatively similar attentional bias toward emotions in chimpanzees
in Experiments 1 and 2 failed to show any such effect with isolated
whole body expressions, although we did find such a bias in
humans, by testing a large sample of participants.
The question of why we could not find evidence for an atten-
tional bias toward emotions in chimpanzees has several potential
answers. One explanation is that chimpanzees do not care about
the emotions of conspecifics, and therefore their attention is not
driven toward them. This interpretation, however, is unlikely, as
many previous studies, observational studies and experimental
ones alike, have shown that they do care (Buttelmann et al., 2009;
de Waal, 2011; Izumi, & Kojima, 2004; Kano et al., 2008; Kano
& Tomonaga, 2010; Parr, 2003; Parr, Waller, & Heintz, 2008) and
even mimic subtle expressions (Kret, Tomonaga, & Matsuzawa,
2014). Moreover, this would also go in against evolutionary argu-
ments stating that emotional expressions evolved as adaptations
and are likely to be continuous (Darwin, 1872; Scherer et al., 2011;
van Rooijen et al., 2017). Another possibility is that our stimulus
material was not ecologically valid enough to yield effects in this
particular task in chimpanzees. In our previous study with bono-
bos, more complex, naturalistic social-emotional scenes in color
were used (Kret et al., 2016). In that study, the emotional pictures
included scenes where bonobos (one or more individuals) showed
clear signs of distress (fights, fear grimace, and threat displays) or
were playing and also scenes that can be associated with stress,
such as when there is food at play, or more positive scenes, such
as images of bonobos having sex, which can be used as a means of
(re)establishing social bonds, as is grooming. Furthermore, we
included pictures where bonobos were calling each other (pant
hoot) or were yawning. The stimulus set not only showed more
ecologically valid scenes, but was with the large total number of
unique stimuli and the various emotion categories, much richer
than the stimulus set in the current study. The current stimulus set
was better controlled, but possibly at the cost of naturallness. From
the RT data and observations of the behavior, it became very clear
Figure 4. Emotional dot-probe task in human observers. Visualization of three-way interaction between







































































































404 KRET, MURAMATSU, AND MATSUZAWA
that the emotional scenes evoked emotions in bonobo observers.
From the seven different emotion categories, significant biases
were observed following the pictures showing sex, grooming ses-
sions, and images of yawns. A trend toward significance was
observed for pictures showing distress. Perhaps, had we used
naturalistic scenes in color, or positive emotional scenes, atten-
tional biases toward emotions in the chimpanzees would have
emerged as well. That said, it is unlikely that chimpanzees did not
recognize the emotional content in our images. Previous research
has consistently shown that chimpanzees can explicitly recognize
conspecifics’ emotions, even from grayscaled images (Izumi, &
Kojima, 2004; Parr, 2003, 2004; Parr et al., 2008). Kano and
Tomonaga (2010) investigated sustained attention by measuring
looking times with eye-tracking equipment. They found that chim-
panzees attended longer to desaturated video clips showing ago-
nistic scenes than to neutral scenes but found no differences with
scenes showing play or excitement. Still, in another study that
investigated the holistic processing of faces and behinds in humans
and in the same chimpanzees as in our current study, desaturating
the images had no effect on the “face inversion effect” (demon-
strating expertise in recognizing identities through this modality)
in humans but rendered the “behind inversion effect” that was
specifically observed in chimpanzees when observing images in
color, nonsignificant (Kret & Tomonaga, 2016).
The question that then still remains is whether our stimulus
material was sufficiently strong, carried enough emotionally in-
tense information, to evoke biases in immediate attention or not. In
our study with bonobos, we observed that the more emotionally
intense a picture was rated by their keepers, the faster the bonobos’
responses were when the dot replaced these pictures (Kret et al.,
2016). It must however be noted that the exact same stimuli that in
chimpanzees did not drive attention reliably captured attention in
humans, as was shown in Experiment 3. A possibility is that this
is because humans are more used to derive meaning from sym-
bolic, schematic, or otherwise more artificial images than chim-
panzees. However, research has shown that also in humans, the
more emotional information that is available in a stimulus, whether
from a facial expression, body posture, or social scene, the greater
their level of arousal (as measured by pupil size). In that particular
study, the pupillary response was the greatest following angry
body postures that were placed in violent scenes (Kret et al., 2013).
One idea to follow this up in chimpanzees is to measure arousal,
for example, with thermal imaging or pupillometry, and to directly
compare the effects of photos showing isolated body postures with
those of photos showing naturalistic scenes showing multiple
emotional components from different individuals.
Experiment 3 investigated to what extent humans can recognize
human and chimpanzee expressions of fear and anger as compared
with neutral expressions. We observed that humans are better at
recognizing expressions of fear and anger when shown by a human
as compared with a chimpanzee. Chimpanzee expressions of fear
were often rated as angry, possibly due to the display of the sharp
canines, which might have been interpreted as purely threatening.
Whereas subsequent fear- and anger-intensity ratings were posi-
tively correlated when they concerned chimpanzee stimuli, they
were negatively correlated in response to human stimuli. This
means that humans rated the chimpanzee stimuli more on arousal
and the human stimuli on fearfulness and anger specifically (see
also Results in the online supplemental material where humans did
not recognize the angry chimpanzee stimuli as being negative and
arousing stimuli, whereas the fearful chimpanzees were rated as
very negatively and very arousing). It is without doubt useful to be
able to differentiate between different expressions of emotion from
conspecifics. For example, not being able to distinguish between
anger and fear will likely result in inappropriate responses with
negative or even dangerous consequences. From the evolutionary
perspective, it is also relevant for humans to recognize emotions in
other animals to some extent, but perhaps it is oftentimes sufficient
to know whether an animal is stressed and agitated as compared
with when it is relaxed and at ease.
The humans that we tested had no experience with chimpanzees
whatsoever, and it is possible that accurate cross-species emotion
recognition comes with experience and learning (Martin-Malivel,
& Okada, 2007). That said, there were no differences in attentional
bias toward fearful as compared with angry stimuli. Both expres-
sions attracted attention more than neutral ones (for similar results,
see de Valk et al., 2015). Most interestingly, this was also true for
the chimpanzee expressions: Humans attended to those more read-
ily than to images of chimpanzees in a relaxed, neutral state. It is
possible that had we added sound and dynamics to the stimulus
material, naïve humans would have also explicitly recognized the
specific emotion in chimpanzees. The similar attentional bias for
human and chimpanzee expressions fits with the findings of a
previous study that also tested Darwin’s emotional continuity
hypothesis (Belin et al., 2008). In their study, authors compared
humans’ perception of human and animal vocalizations on the
explicit, behavioral level and on the neurophysiological level. The
results showed that although humans failed to accurately discrim-
inate rhesus macaques’ and cats’ affective vocalizations and whether
these were positive or negative, the functional MRI results re-
vealed successful discrimination, with the patterns of neural acti-
vation mirroring those obtained for human affective vocalizations.
Possibly, this auditory activation pattern reflected low-level acous-
tical differences between the vocalizations. Similarly in our study,
structural differences related to arousal or valence that are similar
across humans and chimpanzees might have accounted for the
attentional bias toward emotional expressions. Overall, this sug-
gests an important degree of evolutionary continuity with respect
to the underlying mechanisms.
There is a large literature showing that emotional expressions of
others may be processed without awareness (Tamietto et al., 2009;
Tamietto, & De Gelder, 2010). A predication that we therefore had
and that was further based on a meta-analysis (Bar-Haim et al.,
2007) was that the predicted attentional bias toward emotions
would be stronger when stimuli were presented subliminally com-
pared with those when stimuli were presented supraliminally (e.g.,
when processed unconsciously compared to consciously). This is
not what we found. Presentation duration did not modulate the
relationship between the emotional content presented on the target
image and RTs on touching the probe. Instead, presentation dura-
tion did have an effect on RTs depending on the emotion of the
distracting image and differentially so for human as compared with
chimpanzee expressions. The precise pattern is complex, but it is
potentially interesting to note that it is exactly reversed for chim-
panzee compared with the human expressions, whereas no such
reversal occurs for the neutral expressions. What this means ex-






































































































405EMOTION PROCESSING IN HUMANS AND CHIMPANZEES
Our study has several limitations. A limitation of this study is
that the chimpanzees were captive animals having interacted with
humans throughout their lives. Although they might not have seen
human expressions of anger or fear that often, it is still possible
that their reactions to human emotion expressions are not gener-
alizable to wild animals, who might have shown different re-
sponses to stimuli of humans whom they have rarely encountered.
Another limitation is that our study did not have sufficient power
to specifically compare biases toward anger as compared with fear.
Our study did not include a neutral–neutral condition. Future
studies might benefit from such an experimental condition, as this
allows for the investigation of attentional biases versus difficulties
with disengaging from certain stimuli. Specifically, one can then
compare RTs on threat-neutral trials with neutral–neutral trials
(Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004).
Previous research has shown that certain factors might modulate
the effects obtained on the emotional dot-probe task, one of them
being threat intensity (Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, Verschuere,
& De Houwer, 2005; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Hou-
wer, 2004, 2006; Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004). For
example, Wilson and MacLeod (2003) found that both high and
low trait anxious individuals exhibited attentional biases toward
highly threatening stimuli in the dot-probe task, though only high
trait anxious individuals exhibited attentional biases toward mildly
threatening stimuli. Future studies should therefore aim to take
these factors into account (for a critical review on this task and
further recommendations, see Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009).
To conclude, applying well-established psychological paradigms to
our closest relatives represents a promising approach to providing
insight into similarities and differences between humans and apes.
Over 500 articles have been published on the dot-probe task,
showing that humans have an attentional bias toward emotional
expressions, especially to those representing threats (for a review,
see van Rooijen et al., 2017). For social species such as primates,
efficiently responding to others’ emotions has great survival value.
The present study applies a popular psychological test to the
chimpanzee and compares findings with humans. Even though the
lack of effects in the chimpanzee subjects requires further inves-
tigation, we demonstrate that humans have heightened attention to
emotional as compared with neutral individuals, independent of
whether these individuals are humans or chimpanzees, thus partly
supporting evolutionary continuity claims.
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Open Call for Papers: Floating Ideas on Theta Waves
The goal of this special issue of Behavioral Neuroscience is to highlight progress made during the
past 10 years in understanding the cellular mechanisms of theta generation, its role in organizing
cognition, and the relationship between theta and single-unit activity across the brain in animal
models and humans. We welcome submission of reviews and primary research reports that explore
the function of theta in both animals and humans and from a range of perspectives, including
anatomy, behavior and pharmacology, electrophysiology, and computational modeling.
Manuscripts should be prepared according to the manuscript submission information on the Behavioral
Neuroscience homepage (http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/bne/) following formatting requirements and
manuscript length guidelines. Full manuscripts must be submitted through the Behavioral Neuroscience
submission portal (https://www.editorialmanager.com/bne/). The submission deadline for the special
issue is April 1, 2019. Submissions will undergo masked peer review.
Background
The theta rhythm was first described after observation that a prominent 412 Hz oscillation dominated the
local field potential during active behavior in animals. Since this seminal finding, the theta rhythm has
been found in numerous brain structures across a wide range of species, and has been correlated with
many distinct behavioral states. Nonetheless, the role of theta for organizing behavior continues to be an
active area of research that still has much left to reveal regarding the relationship between cognition,
oscillations and single neuron activity. The goal of this special issue is to provide a contemporary
overview of theory along with novel experimental results regarding the unique role of theta for
organizing behavior in multiple species.
Special Issue Editors
Sara N. Burke, PhD and Andrew P. Maurer from University of Florida will serve as guest editors in
collaboration with Rebecca D. Burwell, PhD from Brown University.
The editors span a range of expertise regarding theta behavioral and electrophysiological correlates in
awake, behaving animal models.
For further questions related to this special issue, please contact Sara N. Burke, PhD (burkes@ufl.edu)






































































































409EMOTION PROCESSING IN HUMANS AND CHIMPANZEES
